

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 4869

EXDIS

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TAGS: PFOR, KS, KN, UN

SUBJ: KOREA IN 28TH UNGA: SITREP AS OF AFTERNOON NOV. 16

SUMMARY. CHINESE, WHILE REAFFIRMING COMMITMENT, STILL HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED ABILITY TO LINE UP DPRK COSPONSORS BEHIND CONSENSUS. CONTINUING CHINESE VAGUENESS ABOUT WHEN CONSENSUS WILL BE SURFACED HAS INCREASED ROK AND ALLIES UNEASINESS ABOUT RISKS OF DELAY. WE HAVE SOUGHT THROUGH TALKS WITH CHINESE TO FIND MEANS TO HELP THEIR EFFORT ALONG. END SUMMARY.

1. REFLECTING ROK AND KEY COSPONSORS CONCERN ABOUT LACK OF EVIDENCE THAT CHINESE CAN DELIVER ON COMMITMENT, THAYER HELD FOUR TELECONS WITH CHOU THROUGH AFTERNOON AND EVENING NOV 15 TO CONSULT ON MEANS BY WHICH OUR SIDE MIGHT HELP PROCESS ALONG, GIVE CHOU OPPORTUNITY TO INDICATE REASON FOR DELAY; AND REASSURE ROK AND COSPONSORS. AFTER WE REPORTED TO ROK AND KEY COSPONSORS IN LATE NIGHT MEETING NOV 15, THEY REACTED WITH DISMAY AND POINTED SKEPTICISM; GROUP SHOWED GROWING BELIEF THAT ALTERNATIVE TACTICS NECESSARY AND SOME SENTIMENT THAT BY EARLY NEXT WEEK WE MUST DECIDE UPON CUT-OFF DATE (ROK PROPOSED NOV 21) TO ABANDON CHINESE AND ADOPT ALTERNATIVE APPROACH.

2. OUR EFFORT WITH CHOU DURING DAY WAS DEVOTED TO THESE PRINCIPAL GOALS:

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(A) TO CONVEY CLEARLY OUR ALLIES' FRUSTRATION AND ANXIETY PRODUCED BY CONTINUED SLIPPAGE IN DATE FOR SURFACING CONSENSUS: HUANG HAD ORIGINALLY NAMED MONDAY NOV 12 AS DATE FOR FULL COSPONSORS AGREEMENT ON TEXT. CHINESE HAD

GIVEN NO RECENT INDICATION WHEN PRIVATE THIRD PARTY (FIRST COMITE CHAIRMAN) MIGHT VERIFY COMMITMENT. CHINESE WERE STILL REAFFIRMING COMMITMENT, WHICH ROK AND COSPONSORS HAVE NO DOUBT IN GOOD FAITH, BUT OBJECTIVE SITUATION NATURALLY PROMPTED ROK AND ALLIES TO QUESTION WHETHER PRC IS NOT OVERESTIMATING ABILITY TO DELIVER. WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF NORTH KOREAN PROGRESS IN BRINGING ALONG OPPOSITION COSPONSORS, OUR ALLIES CONCERNED ABOUT PROTECTING THEIR INTERESTS. ROK HAS MAJOR NATIONAL STAKE IN OUTCOME; ROK HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO ALL COSPONSORS TO CHOOSE TACTICS THAT LIKELY TO SUCCEED. OUR KEY COSPONSORS, HAVING BEEN WILLING TO ACT ON SINO-US DEAL, INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF US FOR FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE IT CAN SUCCEED. THEREFORE SOME SHOWING OF MOVEMENT ESSENTIAL FOR PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING CONFIDENCE WITHIN OUR GROUP.

(B) TO UNDERLINE FOR CHINESE HAZARDS OF EXCESSIVE DELAY: THE LONGER WE WAIT TO GET BROAD SUPPORT FOR TEXT THE MORE WE RISK LOSING CRITICAL FIRST COMITE LEAD TO ACTIVIST UNCOMMITTED DELEGATIONS--AND PERHAPS EVEN COSPONSORS FROM BOTH SIDES--WHO PREPARING TO PROPOSE OWN COMPROMISE DRAFTS. SUCH DRAFTS, WHICH THREATENING FROM MANY QUARTERS, COULD SUDDENLY ATTRACT OTHERS' SUPPORT, FACING US WITH FAIT ACCOMPLI AND FORCING US TO ACCEPT LANGUAGE AND SOLUTION WHICH US-CHINESE TEXT PUTS ASIDE.

(C) TO ELICIT CLEARER READING ON WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING ON OTHER SIDE IN ORDER TO REASSURE ROK AND KEY SUPPORTERS THAT CAUSES OF DELAY ARE NOT GOING TO BE CAUSES OF EVENTUAL FAILURE.

(D) TO ELICIT CLEARER DEFINITION OF WHAT UN ATMOSPHERE, IN CHINESE VIEW, MUST EXIST BEFORE CONSENSUS PUBLICLY AGREED UPON. CHINESE PREVIOUSLY SPOKE OF CONSENSUS NATURALLY EVOLVING OUT OF UN COMPROMISE MOOD REFLECTED BY MANY UN MEMBERS, WITH FOCUS AWAY FROM CHINA AND US. IN THAT CASE,
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IS ATMOSPHERE TO BE ARTIFICALLY STIMULATED OR DO CHINESE FEEL IT BEST THAT WE REMAIN PASSIVE, AWAITING EVENTS ON SIDE? ROK AND ALLIES ARE COMMITTED TO SAME RESULT AS CHINESE; HOW CAN ROK SIDE HELP? IS THERE SOME INITIATIVE WE COULD TAKE NOW THAT WOULD FACILITATE CHINESE/DPRK EFFORT?

3. CHOU, WHILE REMAINING VAGUE ABOUT MANY ASPECTS, AGREED THAT TIME WAS NOW RIPE FOR SOME OF OUR COSPONSORS, AND PERHAPS NON-COSPONSORING SUPPORTERS, TO BEGIN STIMULATING COUNTERPARTS ON DPRK SIDE TO TALK ABOUT COMPROMISE. THIS COULD START IMMEDIATELY. WE AGREED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT NETHERLANDS COULD REVIVE DISCUSSION ON KOREA WITH SYRIA (WHICH, ALONG WITH NETHERLANDS-ALGERIA DISCUSSION RESULTED

IN COMPROMISE IN BOTH GENERAL COMMITTEE AND FIRST COMMITTEE).
PURPOSE OF THESE AND OTHER PROBES WOULD BE TO HASTEN THE
CREATION OF THE TYPE OF ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH DPRK COSPONSORS
WOULD BE MOST RECEPTIVE TO A CONSENSUS AND FROM WHICH AGREED
TEXT COULD EMERGE. CHOU WAS INSISTENT THAT FROM CHINESE
VIEWPOINT ANY ROK-INITIATED CONTACTS WITH DPRK COSPONSORS
MUST AVOID AT THIS STAGE ANY MENTION OF SPECIFIC LANGUAGE.
WE AGREED, CONFIRMING ONCE MORE THAT WE WOULD ABIDE BY
CHINESE JUDGMENT.

4. IN DISCUSSING THIS TACTIC, WE SOUGHT TO GET AS SPECIFIC
GUIDANCE FROM CHOU AS POSSIBLE AS TO WHOM OUR COSPONSORS SHOULD
AND SHOULD NOT CONTACT. THIS EXCHANGE PRODUCED SOME INSIGHTS
INTO STATUS OF DPRK EFFORTS WITH COSPONSORS AND OF CHINESE
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ATTITUDES OF OTHER SIDE. FOR EXAMPLE, CHOU
SAID HE WAS "AFRAID THAT" DPRK (THROUGH WHOM CHINESE CLAIMED
TO BE WORKING EXCLUSIVELY) HAD CONTACTED "VERY FEW" SUPPORTERS
ABOUT COMPROMISE POSSIBILITY. DESPITE HUANG'S CONTRARY
IMPLICATION TO SCALI, CHOU DENIED THAT HE WAS YET
CONFIDENT ABOUT ALGERIA'S RECEPTIVITY TO COMPROMISE.
IN ASKING THAYER IF ANY OF OUR COSPONSORS KNEW ALGERIAN
REP WELL, CHOU VOLUNTEERED THAT HE PERSONALLY "CANNOT
ASCERTAIN THE MOOD OF THE ALGERIANS," AND THUS HE DIDN'T
FEEL IN POSITION TO RECOMMEND A DIRECT APPROACH. LATER
WE AGREED IT WOULD BE WISE FOR OUR SIDE TO AVOID ALGERIA
FOR THE PRESENT. WHEN ASKED IF TARGETS OF ROK-LAUNCHED
PROBES SHOULD INCLUDE SOVIET BLOC, CHOU SAID THIS WOULD
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BE PREMATURE. WHEN ASKED ABOUT ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA,
HE GAVE PERSONAL VIEW AGAINST TARGETTING THESE TWO BUT SAID
HE WISHED TO CHECK FURTHER. LATER IN EVENING HE ADVISED
AGAINST APPROACHES TO THESE TWO. CHOU DISPLAYED NO CLEAR
VIEWS ON OTHER TARGETS, SAYING HE WILLING TO LEAVE CHOICES
TO US.

5. DURING THESE CONVERSATIONS, CHOU DID NOT ONCE ENGAGE
IN HABITUAL LECTURE ON CONFIDENTIALITY. (WE HAD EARLIER
TOLD CHOU THAT SINCE WE HAD PROMISED MAXIMUM EFFORT ON THIS
AND WERE KEEPING PROMISE, CHINESE REMINDERS UNNECESSARY.)
HOWEVER, WE DID DISCUSS ARTICLE IN THE NEW YORK POST AND OTHER
SPECULATIVE STORIES RELATED BOTH TO SECRETARY'S TRIP AND
TO COMPROMISE TRENDS IN NEW YORK. CHOU DISPLAYED WORRY THAT
THIS SORT OF SPECULATION MIGHT INTENSIFY FOCUS ON US-PRC
CONTACTS AND THUS UPSET EFFORT, BUT HE DID NOT SUGGEST
SUCH STORIES CAME FROM KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES ON OUR
SIDE.

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